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I.

INTRODUCTION

In an episode of the popular television series Seinfeld, George
Costanza narrowly avoids stepping in a pile of horse manure and
emphatically declares, "[M]anure's not that bad. I don't even mind the
word 'manure.' You know, it's, it's 'nure,' which is good and a 'ma' in
front of it. MA-NURE. When you consider the other choices, 'manure'
is actually pretty refreshing."'
Not everyone shares George's enthusiasm for animal
excrement. Agricultural waste has been a source of community
distress for generations. In 1932, a California appellate court
determined that a dairy, hog-raising, and cattle-raising operation
constituted a nuisance under state law. 2 The offending farm rested on
eighty acres of land across the highway from the plaintiff.3 Although
farmer Howard Cook was engaged in a lawful and ordinary business,
according to the court, the manure that his forty-six cows and herd of

1.
Seinfeld: The Soup (NBC television broadcast Nov.
http://www.seinfeldscripts.comrTheSoup.html.
2.
Cook v. Hatcher, 9 P.2d 231, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932).
3. Id. at 231.

10,

1994),

available at
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pigs produced "so befouled the atmosphere as to interfere with the use,
comfort and enjoyment of the [plaintiffs] property." 4 The court also
was convinced that "breeding cows [next to] the highway" constituted
a nuisance. 5 Relying on nuisance cases involving air pollution from
factories, laundromats, and gas companies, the court clarified
California law by concluding that it is "not necessary that the health
of [the plaintiff] or members of his household ... be impaired. It is
6
sufficient if the odors [and] sounds ... were offensive to the senses."
The court enjoined Cook from continuing the nuisance and suggested
that he move the offensive activity to a more remote location on his
property. 7 Unfortunately for Mr. Cook, such a holding required that he
either stop farming altogether or tear down his facilities and rebuild
his operation in a location farther from the road. As a result of the
nuisance suit, an offensive odor caused by a small herd of cattle and
pigs placed Mr. Cook's entire farm in jeopardy.
While public perception of agricultural waste has not improved
since Cook v. Hatcher, the agriculture industry has changed
significantly. In 1880, twenty-two million people lived on farms; today,
fewer than five million people do.8 Although the number of farms has
declined drastically, average farm size has actually increased; the top
twenty percent of productive farms account for ninety percent of all
farm output. 9 Many of these large-scale farms are concentrated animal
feeding operations ("CAFOs"), which are farms that accommodate a
sizable number of animals. 10 Because of the growing number of
CAFOs in the United States, American agriculture has maintained its
productivity despite a decreasing number of farms nationwide. The
agriculture industry contributes more than one trillion dollars to the
U.S. economy, constitutes more than thirteen percent of the nation's
gross domestic product, and employs approximately seventeen percent
of the country's labor force.1 1

4.
Id. at 232.
5.
Id.
6.
Id. at 234 (citation omitted).
7.
Id. at 235.
8.
Alexander A. Reinhert, Note, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1698 (1998).
9.
Id.
10.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA REP. 7,100,142, ANIMAL WASTE DISPOSAL ISSUES 1

(1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/1997/hogchpl.htm. According to the EPA, a
'large CAFO" is one with over 1000 head of beef cattle, 700 head of dairy cattle, 2500 hogs, or
30,000 broilers. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(4) (2007). A "small CAFO" can have fewer than 200 dairy
cows, 300 beef cows, 750 hogs, or 9000 broilers. § 122.23(b)(6)-(9).
11. Elisa Paster, Preservationof Agricultural Lands Through Land Use PlanningTools and
Techniques, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 284 (2004).
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Large-scale farming has benefited the international community
as well. Between 1961 and 1993, the global population increased by
eighty percent. 12 Total cropland grew by only eight percent, but the
global per capita food supply increased by twenty percent. 13 As a
result of employing intensive farming techniques, such as using
fertilizers and irrigation, agricultural productivity increased 14 and the
number of malnourished people worldwide decreased substantially.
In spite of its contribution to the American economy and the
global food supply, American agriculture faces a dilemma not unlike
that with which Cook dealt seventy-five years ago: an increasing
number of nuisance suits against farmers. Much of America's
farmland rated "prime" for agricultural production is also highly
amenable to residential development. 15 Farmers who refuse to sell
their land to real estate developers for a high profit may find
themselves at the receiving end of a nuisance suit when new
neighbors who move to the area find the fragrance of farming at odds
with their personal tastes. Justice George Sutherland described a
"nuisance" as "merely a right thing in the wrong place-like a pig in a
parlor instead of a barnyard."'16 As residential communities spring up
in once agricultural areas, the barnyard is transformed into a parlor
where, it seems, livestock no longer belong.
Urbanization is not solely to blame for the increasing number
of nuisance suits against farmers. Agriculture also has a tremendous
effect on the environment, emitting pollutants into the air, soil, and
water. Agriculture may be the leading human influence on the
environment; farming uses thirty-six percent of the earth's land, is the
largest consumer of freshwater resources, and is a significant source of
greenhouse gases that cause global warming. 17 Farming also
contributes to water pollution in the United States through soil
erosion, which carries pesticides, manure, and other chemicals into
the nation's waterways.' 8 Intensive farming can produce water

12. David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture:
Towards a Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 8
(2002).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Reinhert, supranote 8,at 1699.
16. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
17. Adelman & Barton, supra note 12, at 4.
18. Christopher B. Connard, Note, Sustaining Agriculture: An Examination of Current
Legislation Promoting Sustainable Agriculture as an Alternative to Conventional Farming
Practices, 13 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 125 (2004).
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pollution, habitat loss, air pollution, and soil erosion, 19 and public
concern regarding agricultural pollution is growing.
Sustainable agriculture, which is the ability to produce food
indefinitely without causing irreparable environmental harm, has
emerged as a means of reducing the damage caused by conventional
agricultural practices. Sustainable agriculture lessens the impact of
farming on the environment while maintaining, or even increasing,
profitability. 20 Sustainable farming practices include diversified crop
production, pest and weed control, soil fertility and cultivation, tilling
methods that preserve crop residue, and livestock production on cropfocused farms. 21 Ultimately, sustainable agriculture encourages
practices that are both environmentally sound and economically
22
feasible.
In spite of its perceived benefits, changes in environmental
statutory and common law have yet to expand sustainable
agriculture's reach. As demonstrated by Cook v. Hatcher, plaintiffs can
initiate common law suits attacking activities that interfere with the
use and enjoyment of their property. 23 But in determining nuisance
remedies, courts may undervalue nuisance-generating behavior by
ignoring the non-quantifiable benefits of agricultural production.
Federal statutes, which are also sources of environmental regulation,
are no more effective at promoting sustainable agriculture than
common law. Some statutes include de facto exemptions for
agricultural activities. 2 4 It is also difficult to regulate agriculture
through federal statutes because agricultural production is often
decentralized, and states are not equipped to enforce environmental
statutes on their own. 25 Although common law and statutory law
address pollution from farming, they face seemingly insurmountable
challenges.
Contract law offers an alternative method of environmental
regulation that successfully promotes sustainable agriculture. By
negotiating contracts known as good neighbor agreements ("GNAs"),

19. Adelman & Barton, supra note 12, at 5.
20. Connard, supra note 18, at 136-37.
21. Id. at 136.
22. Id. at 136-37.
23. 9 P.2d 231, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932).
24. Adelman & Barton, supra note 12, at 5. By exempting agriculture, the government is
making a tradeoff between limiting agricultural expansion to help the environment and
permitting agriculture to be a source of negative environmental externalities. Id. at 10.
25. The Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act generally target point source pollution rather
than non-point source pollution. Id. With over two million farms nationwide, agricultural
pollution is primarily non-point source pollution. Id.
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farmers and local community members can work cooperatively to
make farm operations more transparent and environmentally friendly
while simultaneously protecting farmers from potential nuisance
suits. These agreements, which require self-regulation and public
participation, are arguably the best response to the shortcomings of
environmental law. After hundreds of years of nuisance law and
twenty-five years of command-and-control regulations, agricultural
law is ready for a more innovative means of environmental regulation,
26
which comes in the form of GNAs.
Part II of this Note analyzes the history of environmental
regulation as it applies to agricultural production and, in particular,
CAFOs. It describes the evolution of common law, which includes
nuisance and trespass. It also describes statutory law, which includes
the Clean Air Act; Clean Water Act; Safe Drinking Water Act; and
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. Part III discusses
the shortcomings in both common law and command-and-control
regulations and explains why both approaches fail to regulate
agricultural production effectively. Part IV establishes that contract
law, through the use of GNAs, is a superior alternative to the current
approaches, and it describes how these agreements should be
negotiated between farmers and community groups. Part V concludes,
arguing GNAs are a superior method of regulating the environmental
effects of agriculture over the current common law and statutory
schemes.

II. HISTORY OF REGULATING AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION
Congress, federal and state agencies, the judiciary, and private
citizens traditionally have regulated agricultural pollution. The
common law permits private citizens to sue agricultural polluters in
tort for nuisance and trespass, and courts determine the appropriate
relief to award parties injured by tortious behavior. Congress has
authorized federal and state agencies to regulate agricultural
pollution. Both common law and statutory methods of regulation
address pollution caused by agricultural production.
A. Common Law Regulations
The common law of tort regulates pollution ex post facto and
acts as a deterrent against environmental degradation by imposing

26. Michael Ray Harris, Promoting Corporate Self-Compliance: An Examination of the
Debate Over Legal Protectionfor EnvironmentalAudits, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 663, 664 (1996).
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liability on environmental polluters. 27 The two common law actions
most commonly used to address agricultural pollution are nuisance
28
and trespass.
1. Nuisance Suits as a Source of Environmental Regulation
Although not all nuisance claims address environmental
degradation, nuisance suits provide the predominant means for
regulating agricultural pollution. A nuisance is any interference with
the use and enjoyment of one's property. 29 A nuisance is not
necessarily an injury to another person's property, but rather it is an
injury to another that results from property use. 30 According to Ronald
H. Coase and other scholars of the law and economics movement,
environmental degradation is the result of market failures, and courts
through nuisance suits determine how best to use society's resources
to cope with these failures. 31 Courts weigh the benefits of preventing
the degradation against the loss that would result from stopping the
harmful action to determine whether a particular activity constitutes
32
a nuisance.
Nuisance suits involving agricultural production are much
more common in the United States today than they were a hundred
years ago. When land use was primarily agrarian, nuisance suits
against farming operations were infrequent. 3 3 Industrialization forced
courts to acknowledge the tension between prohibiting landowners
from using property injuriously and permitting landowners to put
property to its most beneficial use. 34 Whether a farm is more valuable
than a subdivision, for instance, is one of the many difficult questions
35
that courts ruling on nuisance claims may address.
27. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & Theodore A. Feitshans, Nuisance Revisited After
Buchanan and Bormann, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 121, 122 (2000) (describing a nuisance suit
generally).
28. Helen M. Maher, Attempting to Legislate Attempted Environmental Crimes, 15 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 735, 741 (1998).
29. Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 27, at 122-23.
30. Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 97
(1998).
31. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27 (1960).
32. Id.
33. Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to Affect
the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 407 (1997).
34. Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, 32 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 113, 147 (2005).
35. "[l]n shepherding the transition from a small-scale agrarian and mercantile economy to
a great industrial and commercial one, nuisance in effect became a battleground between
competing land uses." Halper, supra note 30, at 101-02.
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Nuisances may be either public or private. A public nuisance is
an interference with the public's right to use or enjoy land. 36 To raise a
public nuisance claim, a plaintiff must allege "a significant
interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace,
the public comfort, or the public convenience." 37 Public nuisance
actions commonly allege harm to public health, such as keeping
infectious cattle or maintaining a pond that breeds malarial
mosquitoes. 38 Malodors can also be raised as incompatible with the
public comfort in a public nuisance action. 39 Courts have determined,
for instance, that foul odors emitted from fat processing facilities and
noxious odors from pig farms constitute public nuisances. 40
By contrast, a private nuisance is "an unreasonable
interference with the use or enjoyment of land owned or leased by a
private plaintiff."4 1 To determine whether an activity constitutes a
private nuisance, courts weigh the gravity of the interference with the
plaintiffs use of his land against the adverse effects of suppressing the
defendant's economic productivity. 42 As with public nuisance actions, a
private landowner may bring an action against a neighbor for noxious
odors or physical damage to the plaintiffs property. 43
For an agricultural practice to constitute a nuisance, it must
interfere with either a public right or the plaintiffs use of private land
in a way that is (1) intentional and unreasonable or (2) unintentional
but otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for
negligent or reckless conduct or for abnormally dangerous conditions
or activities. 44 An intentional interference is unreasonable if the
gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the defendant's conduct or
the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of
compensating for this and similar harm to others would make the
continuation of the conduct infeasible. 45 To determine the gravity of
the harm, a jury must consider the: (1) extent of the harm, (2)
character of the harm, (3) social value of the use invaded, (4)

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 27, at 123.
Maher, supra note 28, at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id.

41.

3-16 PHILIP WEINBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 16.02[1] (2007).

42.

Farber, supra note 34, at 118.

43.

WEINBERG, supra note 41.

44. Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 27, at 123.
45. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979) (defining unreasonable
interference).
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suitability of that use to the character of the locality, and (5) burden
46
on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
Michigan common law exemplifies how competing land uses
have come to the forefront of the debate in nuisance suits in recent
years. In 1949, the Michigan Supreme Court found that a
businessman who ran a piggery and garbage disposal company
violated state nuisance laws in his management of the garbage
compost. 47 Although the court gave the farmer one month to move or
close his operation, it did not grant his request for an extension,
reasoning that the plaintiff should not be subjected to the nuisance
through the summer months when the compost's odor would be most
unbearable. 48 Twenty years later, in a similar suit involving compost
on a mushroom farm, the Michigan Court of Appeals reached the
opposite conclusion when it found that a farmer should not be
required to close down his operation if a remedy substantially
eliminating the noxious effects of the composting operation could be
devised. 49 Michigan courts focus on balancing the equities or the
parties' interests to protect private land use.
Because land is considered unique and irreplaceable, the
traditional remedy for a nuisance is an injunction. 50 Modern courts
concerned with the adverse effects of injunctions on economic
productivity attempt to balance the equities to determine when
injunctions should be issued. 5 1 For instance, a North Carolina
appellate court concluded that, to award damages in a private
nuisance action, the defendant's interference with the plaintiffs
property must be unreasonable. 52 To award injunctive relief, however,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct that led to the
interference is also unreasonable. 53 A defendant who pollutes a creek
by spreading fertilizer on his property, for example, might
unreasonably interfere with a neighbor's use of the creek for
swimming and fishing, even though the defendant's conduct of
spreading fertilizer might not be unreasonable. In states such as
North Carolina, the neighbor would be entitled to damages but not
injunctive relief. Schemes like this indicate that states may modify the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
46 (N.C.
53.

Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 27, at 123.
Gillespie v. Greene, 37 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Mich. 1949).
Id.
Fortin v. Vitali, 167 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
Farber, supra note 34, at 118.
Id.
Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 27, at 124 (citing Parker v. Barefoot, 502 S.E.2d 42,
Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 519 S.E.2d 315 (N.C. 1999)).
Id.
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remedies available in nuisance suits to balance the equities between
two parties who are interested in putting land to its most productive
use.
2. Trespass as a Source of Environmental Regulation
Although not widely used to deter agricultural pollution,
trespass is another common law action that can serve as a source of
environmental regulation. A defendant is liable for trespass if he
intentionally (1) enters land in the possession of another or causes a
thing or a third person to do so, (2) remains on the land, or (3) fails to
54
remove from the land a thing that he is under a duty to remove.
Unlike nuisance, trespass requires an intentional invasion of the
plaintiffs property. 55 Because this element of intent places a high
burden of proof on the plaintiff, residents seldom succeed in trespass
cases against landowners for agricultural pollution.
B. Statutes and Regulations
In recent years, statutory law, through sophisticated
regulatory regimes, has supplanted common law as the chief
mechanism of environmental regulation. 56 Federal statutes and
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regulations employ two
standards to restrict pollution: ambient standards and technology
standards. Ambient standards set the maximum levels of pollution the
public should be required to endure. 57 Although ambient standards
limit the allowable level of pollution in the environment, they fail to
indicate whether a particular source has caused the excessive
pollution through unreasonable use. 58 As a result, the EPA imposes
permit
and
other
source-specific
requirements
technology
requirements on point sources of pollution. In some cases, criminal
penalties are also available. 59 The primary civil penalties for violating
either the technology requirements or ambient standards are, like the
54. Maher, supra note 28.
55. Id.
56. Farber, supra note 34, at 114 (citing Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,
871 (N.Y. 1970)).
57. Heimert, supra note 33, at 416. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,143, 61,144 (Dec. 18, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50)
(listing the EPA's ambient standard for particulate matter in air); 1999 Update of Ambient
Water Quality Criteria for Ammonia, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,973, 71,976 (Dec. 22, 1999) (describing the
recommended ambient standards for ammonia in water).
58. Heimert, supra note 33, at 416.
59. Id. at 427.
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common law, fines and injunctions. 60 In addition, the EPA may ban
firms from receiving government contracts if they fail to comply with
61
environmental standards.
In addition to these two general requirements, each
environmental statute imposes specific requirements on parties
subject to its terms. Although farmers are not subject to every
congressional act within the EPA's executive authority, under the
following Acts, the EPA is authorized to regulate agricultural
production.
1. Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act ("CAA'), which Congress last amended in
1990,62 was enacted to reduce air pollution by establishing ambient

standards for certain "criteria" pollutants 63 and requiring stationary
sources with emissions above a certain threshold to abide by uniform
technology requirements. 64 States must submit implementation plans
to the EPA that detail enforceable emissions limits and programs to
provide for enforcement. 65 Non-attainment areas, which are regions
that are not in compliance with CAA ambient standards, have stricter
emissions limits that are designed to make "reasonable further
progress" 66 toward compliance. 67 Even in these non-attainment
areas,6 8 however, emissions may be permissible if the proposed
sources have the lowest achievable emissions rate6 9 and the polluters
70
obtain offsetting emissions reductions from other sources.
Emissions from farms and CAFOs are not monitored under the
CAA even though these sources can emit nitrous oxides, hydrogen

60. Maher, supra note 28, at 748.
61. Id.
62. S. 1630, 101st Cong. § 101 (1990).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)-(2) (2007).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h) (describing the Administrator's authority to establish such
requirements).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)-(2).
66. "Reasonable further progress" means "such annual incremental reductions in emissions
of the relevant air pollutant as are required ...[to ensure] attainment of the applicable national
ambient air quality standard .. "42 U.S.C. § 7501.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7502; Heimert, supra note 33, at 418.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 7502.
69. Making the initial assessment of the lowest achievable emissions rate should take into
consideration any technologies, practices or limits in effect. Memorandum from John S. Seitz,
Dir. Stationary Source Compliance Div., Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards to Thomas
J. Maslany, Dir. Air Mgmt. Div. Region III, LAER Determination for a Previously Constructed
Source (Aug. 9, 1989), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/nsr/ttnnsrO1/naal/n26_10.html.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c).
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sulfide, volatile organic compounds, and particulate matter, all of
which are regulated by the CAA. 71 In 2005, the EPA announced the
Air Quality Compliance Agreement, which creates a program to study
and correct the insufficient air emissions data and monitoring of
CAFOs. 72 By 2010, the agency will publish "emissions-estimating
methods" for animal feeding operations, which will allow the EPA to
estimate air emissions from CAFOs and enforce the regulatory
requirements of the CAA more stringently. 73 Although the CAA
typically does not regulate farms, it is possible that studies like this
one will allow the EPA to enforce CAA requirements against CAFOs
in the future.
2. Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which regulates water pollution
in the United States, implements standards for point source 74 and
non-point source 75 pollution. 76 Under the CWA, all point sources must
obtain an EPA or state permit after providing evidence that their
discharge will not degrade the water quality below a prescribed level
and technology requirements will be satisfied. 77 A source's emissions
must be at or below the levels they would be under the applicable
technology standard; the source does not actually have to use the
technology as long as it meets the prescribed standard. 78 Unlike the
CAA, the CWA requires states to set ambient standards for each body
of water within its borders. 79 Before issuing a CWA permit to a point
source polluter, the permit writer must determine if the technologybased emissions limit is stringent enough for the particular body of
water to meet its water quality standard.8 0 If the technology limit is
not sufficient, the permit writer must impose an emissions limit on

71. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Civil Enforcement, Animal Feeding Operations Air Quality
Compliance Agreement Fact Sheet (Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
agreements/caa/cafo-fcsht-0501.html# background.
72. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 4958,
4958 (Jan. 31, 2005).
73. Id.
74. "Point sources" are discrete, measurable sources, including pipes and ditches. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14) (2000).
75. "Non-point sources," such as runoff, are not discrete or measurable. Id.
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), (e).
78.

§ 1311(b).

79.

§ 1313(c)(2)(a).

80.

33 U.S.C. § 1312(a).
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the polluter that will satisfy the water quality standard.8 1 The point
source must emit only what is allowed by the more stringent of the
water quality or the technology-based emissions limits.
The CWA takes limited steps toward regulating non-point
source agricultural pollution. Under the Non-Point Source
Management Program, states now are responsible for developing
programs to manage non-point source pollution, including runoff and
82
leaching of fertilizers or pesticides, and irrigation return flows.
States must identify best management practices that should be
employed to reduce pollutant levels and programs to ensure the
implementation of these best practices.8 3 Similarly, under the Total
Maximum Daily Load Program mandated by the CWA, states must
establish maximum daily loads for polluters who fail to meet water
quality standards.8 4 Although these regulations encourage state
enforcement, the Total Maximum Daily Load Program is not federally
enforceable, 8 5 and the EPA seldom enforces the Non-Point Source
Management Program against non-point source polluters. In many
ways, the CWA's provisions addressing the regulation of non-point
sources, including pesticide and fertilizer runoff, remain "moribund,"
thereby creating "a de facto exemption for non-point return flows from
irrigated agriculture and voiding the CWA's regulation of
86
agroenvironmental threats."
3. Safe Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") authorizes the EPA to
identify and limit contaminants in public drinking water supply
systems. The SDWA affects the agriculture industry when the
contaminating effluents in drinking water supplies come from
agricultural operations in the form of pesticides.8 7 Of the hundreds of
pesticides currently on the market, only sixteen were regulated under
the SDWA in 2002.88 In 1996, the SDWA's progress was further
limited: the program was revised to require the EPA to list, at a
89
minimum, only five new substances for regulation every five years.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1329(a).
§ 1329(b)(2)(A).
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1).
Id.
Adelman & Barton, supra note 12, at 17.
Id. at 19.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (2000).
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As a result of this amendment, it is likely that very few agricultural
contaminants will be placed on the SDWA's list in the future.
Although the SDWA affects farmers who use the regulated pesticides,
this Note does not discuss the SDWA in greater detail because of its
minimal effect on the regulation of agricultural pollution.
4. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") limits the types of agrichemicals farmers may use. 90
Because FIFRA primarily regulates carcinogens, however, a chemical
generally is approved unless it is a known carcinogen. 9 1 Furthermore,
once the chemicals are approved, FIFRA does not regulate their
application on agricultural land.9 2 While FIFRA limits the types of
chemicals that can be applied to land, it does not address issues of
pollution resulting from approved chemicals, which significantly limits
its effectiveness at pollution control. Because of FIFRA's limited effect
on agricultural pollution, this Note does not address FIFRA more
thoroughly.
FIFRA and the three other federal statutes described above,
along with common law trespass and nuisance actions, regulate
pollution from agricultural production. As the next Part demonstrates,
these traditional methods of regulation are ineffective at promoting
sustainable agriculture or reducing emissions from agricultural
pollutants.
III. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY LAW ARE INEFFECTIVE
REGULATORS OF AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION

Although common law and statutory law are used most
frequently to curb agricultural pollution, these legal schemes are often
unable to regulate farms and CAFOs effectively. The deficiencies
inherent in using common and statutory law suggest that
agriculturists and environmentalists must find a better alternative for
regulating the environmental effects of agricultural production.

90. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2000) (prohibiting the distribution or sale of unregistered
pesticides).
91. Adelman & Barton, supra note 12, at 20.
92. Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (indicating that only registration is required under the Act).
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A. Common Law as Agriculture'sEnvironmental Regulator
The common law poses a variety of concerns for both the
defendant-farmers who find themselves subject to its sanctions and
the plaintiff-neighbors who file nuisance claims against farmers to
protect their land use and prevent agricultural pollution. The suits
may cause problems for one or both parties and the concerns of the
parties may differ substantially depending on the particular
perspective of each.
1. Concerns of the Defendant-Farmer
Although nuisance law has been used for centuries, it is rarely
the best method for regulating agricultural polluters. Defendantfarmers distrust nuisance suits because of the effects they may have
on agricultural land use. Furthermore, farmers are concerned that
courts will award remedies without considering the non-quantifiable
benefits of agricultural production.
Nuisance suits create a number of problems for farmers and
impede farmers' best efforts to make their farming operations
sustainable. First, farmers receive little protection from litigation
because they can raise very few defenses against nuisance claims.
Historically, farmers could raise "coming to the nuisance," which
occurs when a residential landowner knowingly comes into a
neighborhood reserved for agricultural use and is injured. Although
93
originally intended as an absolute defense against a nuisance claim,
"coming to the nuisance" has changed substantially as a doctrine, and
it is only a factor that courts consider in most states. 94 In 1972, the
Arizona Supreme Court, for instance, determined that cattle feedlots
constituted both a public and private nuisance. 95 The court ordered
the plaintiff, a housing developer who "brought people to the
nuisance," to indemnify the defendant-farmer for his costs to relocate
or shut down the feedlots. 96 However, the court did not consider the
''coming to the nuisance" defense sufficient to protect the farmer from
relocating his farm operation.
Like "coming to the nuisance," statutes of limitations and the
preemption doctrine also provide weak defenses against nuisance
claims. Because each individual act that creates a "nuisance" can
93. Heimert, supra note 33, at 410 (quoting Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co, 494 P.2d
700, 706-07 (Ariz. 1972)).
94. WEINBERG, supra note 41, § 16.02[2b].
95. Spur Indus., 494 P.2d at 708.
96. Id.
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trigger the statute of limitations, as long as the source of the nuisance
is continuing and recurrent, the statute of limitations offers no
defense. 97 If, for example, a defendant-farmer has lived and worked on
his farm in the same manner for the past decade, he still may be liable
in a nuisance action if his most recent offense occurred within the
statutory period. As a result, farmers find it difficult to raise the
statute of limitations defense on a nuisance action when the alleged
nuisance is malodor or waste runoff, which recur frequently (if not
constantly) in an agricultural operation. Likewise, preemption rarely
serves as a defense because federal statutes regulating discharge from
farms do not preempt state nuisance claims, 98 and most states exempt
nuisance actions, at least in part, from preemption. Thus, a defendant
may be liable for regulatory violations and face a nuisance suit
simultaneously.
In addition to having few available defenses, farmers also find
it difficult to distinguish between the agricultural practices that cause
nuisances and those that do not. This uncertainty is due in large part
to the circular definition of "reasonable use." A defendant's use of his
or her land is reasonable if it does not unreasonably interfere with the
plaintiffs use of his or her land. 99 Courts define "reasonableness" and,
consequently, "nuisance" in a variety of ways, which makes the
outcomes of nuisance actions extremely unpredictable. Some courts
find an "unreasonable interference" only when the source of the
nuisance threatens public health. 10 0 Others disagree as to whether the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct or the unreasonableness of
its impact on the plaintiff is more relevant. 10 1 Such ambiguity makes
it difficult for agriculturists to understand what constitutes a nuisance
or to avoid creating one.
Finally, damages awarded in nuisance actions have a more
detrimental effect on farmers than on other defendants because farms
are often illiquid and have undervalued social utility. After finding for
a plaintiff, courts balance the equities by looking at the net costs and
benefits of various remedies to determine if an injunction should be
issued against a defendant or if damages would be sufficient. 10 2 If the
defendant's nuisance activity is of high social utility, it is less likely
that the court will issue an injunction because it would be detrimental
97.
activity,
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

WEINBERG, supra note 41, § 16.02[2c]. Every time the farmer performs the nuisance
the statutory "clock" starts over. Id.
Id. § 16.02(3); see also supra Part II (discussing preemption).
Heimert, supra note 33, at 408.
Id.
Farber, supra note 34, at 118.
See supra Section II(A)(1) (discussing balancing the equities).
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to society to do so. 103 For instance, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Company, New York's highest court upheld the denial of an injunction
against a cement factory that was emitting pollutants. 10 4 The court
denied the injunction because of the public's interest in the continued
operation of the plant. It concluded that requiring the appellant to pay
damages would be less injurious than shutting down the plant's
operations.105

Courts might not be convinced that farms and CAFOs provide
such high social utility that injunctions against them are
inappropriate.1 06 Although some courts may consider a farm's overall
contribution to society, including the preservation of undeveloped
farmland and the agrarian values of hard work and perseverance,
farms might not generate the level of monetary utility necessary to
warrant protection from injunctive relief when compared to factory or
industrial facilities. Farms often operate with low cash flow and
illiquid investments like machinery, land, and livestock, so farms' net
income seldom reflects their total utility. Because some courts only
consider an operation's income to determine whether injunctions are
warranted, farmers have no certainty about whether they will be
enjoined from farming or instead be liable for temporary or permanent
10 7
damages, as was the case in Boomer.
2. Concerns of the Plaintiff-Neighbor
Potential defendant-farmers are not the only parties who find
nuisance suits to be nuisances in and of themselves. The system
governing nuisance suits also hinders likely plaintiffs, including
neighbors, local businesses, and community groups, from regulating
polluters. Transaction costs may prohibit plaintiffs from suing when
the possible benefits of the suit do not exceed the costs of litigation
and negotiation.10 8 Such costs are compounded further by the
substantial uncertainty of whether a nuisance suit even would be
successful. As a result, polluters are rarely challenged in court, which

103. Farber, supra note 34, at 120; see, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,
874 (N.Y. 1970) (providing an example of nuisance activity that the court considered to be of high
social utility).
104. 257 N.E.2d at 875.
105. Id. at 874.
106. Farber, supra note 34, at 120.
107. Heimert, supra note 33, at 410.
108. Id. at 414-15.
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"diminish[es] nuisance law's ability to encourage [an] efficient level of
pollution."109
Even if a plaintiff determines that the probable benefits of a
nuisance action outweigh its economic costs, the plaintiff is still
subject to a free rider problem that may deter him or her from filing a
claim. A potential free rider problem occurs when a member of a group
hopes that another member will assume the costs of litigation and
allow the free rider to benefit from the claim without paying the
costs. 110 Because injunctions benefit everyone in the vicinity of the
pollution, neighbors may not initiate a nuisance action in the hope
that another nearby landowner will file a complaint first.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle for a plaintiff in a nuisance suit
against an agricultural operation is establishing causation.1 1 ' Not only
is it difficult to prove which source caused the pollution, it is also
challenging to prove the polluting operation proximately caused 1 2 the
damage. 1 3 Causation requirements vary from state to state. In some
states, courts apply strict liability to nuisance actions, and plaintiffs
may show something less than proximate cause to recover.1 14 Where a
court requires culpability on the part of the defendant, however, "the
115
nuisance must also be a proximate cause of the defendant's actions."
Regardless of the culpability requirement, an assessment of the
damage is essential to proving causation. The widespread effect of
agricultural pollution makes such an assessment difficult.1 16 A
plaintiff who cannot prove, for example, that the water quality in a
nearby stream is substantially worse today than it was before a
farmer upstream spread fertilizer on nearby fields will have difficulty
proving that the farmer caused the degradation. In fact, the plaintiff
may find it difficult to prove that the stream has been harmed at all.
Finally, right-to-farm laws, also known as anti-nuisance
11
7
laws,
pose unique problems for plaintiffs who file nuisance actions
109. Id.
110. Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law
Remedies for EnvironmentalDecline, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 72 (2002).

111. Daniel P. Larsen, Combating the Exotic Species Invasion: The Role of Tort Liability, 5
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 21, 57 (1995).

112. Proximate cause requires that an actor's liability be limited to those harms that result
from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
PHYSICAL HARM § 29 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
113. Heimert, supra note 33, at 415.
114. Larsen, supra note 111, at 58.
115. Id.
116. Heimert, supra note 33, at 415.
117. Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-toFarm Laws Go too Far?,33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006).
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against neighboring farmers. Right-to-farm laws exist in all fifty
states. 118 Generally, their objectives are to protect farmers from
liability for common law nuisance and to preserve farmland. 19 To
accomplish
these
goals,
some
right-to-farm
laws
prevent
municipalities from passing ordinances that would make an
agricultural operation a nuisance. 120 Minnesota, Mississippi,
Pennsylvania, and Texas require neighbors to file nuisance claims
within a stated time period after the commencement of the offending
activity to satisfy the statutes of limitations.' 2' This requirement
contrasts with most state statutes of limitations that are triggered
after each reoccurrence of the offending activity, and it protects
farmers who commit the offending activity repeatedly over a period of
time. 2 2 Other right-to-farm laws incorporate the "coming to the
nuisance" doctrine, thereby estopping potential plaintiffs who elect to
move near "objectionable agricultural activities" from using nuisance
law to enjoin the existing farming practices. 23 Each of these
provisions creates roadblocks for plaintiff-neighbors seeking to sue
local farmers for environmental degradation.
Right-to-farm laws vary from state to state, as do the
requirements to qualify for protection under the laws. New York's
right-to-farm statute protects agricultural operations from nuisance
suits when the farmland is located in an agricultural district or is
used subject to an agricultural assessment. 124 In Michigan, on the
other hand, farm operations must conform to "generally accepted
agricultural and management practices" to qualify for protection
against nuisance suits. 25 Some states go as far as protecting
agricultural expansion, production changes, and new technology with
anti-nuisance defenses. 26 Thus, a plaintiff must know the status of
the right-to-farm law in his or her state to determine if it applies.
Depending on the statute's content, state law may estop the plaintiff
from filing a nuisance action altogether. The inconsistencies and
variations among right-to-farm laws may discourage potential

118. Reinhert, supra note 8, at 1695.
119. Centner, supra note 117, at 88.
120. Reinhert, supra note 8, at 1695.
121. Centner, supra note 117, at 98.
122. See supra text accompanying note 97 (explaining that typical statutes of limitations
pose a problem for farmers).
123. Centner, supra note 117, at 96.
124. Id. at 113.
125. Id. at 111.
126. Id. at 101-07.
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plaintiff-neighbors from filing nuisance claims or hinder these claims'
success once filed.
3. Concerns of Both Plaintiff and Defendant
Both parties share a number of concerns in nuisance actions
that are indicative of the common law's shortcomings. First, as
indicated above, the "messiness" of the doctrine is enough to concern
even the most eager litigant. 127 In addition, both sides may have
legitimate concerns regarding the judicial competence of those
responsible for resolving the environmental disputes. 128 To effectively
regulate the environment through nuisance law, judges need a level of
scientific knowledge and understanding with which they are not
necessarily equipped. 129 Complex cases involving modern pollution
problems may require judges to make value judgments that will have
a long-term effect on agriculture and the environment and are outside
the scope of their expertise. 130 Furthermore, because nuisance suits
occur ex post facto, a court's holding is a response to a specific problem
rather than an attempt to establish optimal environmental
131
regulations to serve as precedent for future pollution problems.
Parties may also be concerned with the one-sidedness of
nuisance remedies. A fault-based nuisance analysis usually results in
either granting an injunction or allowing the defendant to operate
without interference. 132 Although some courts allow the offensive
activity to continue if the defendant pays damages, most courts have
not gone so far as to enjoin the offensive activity if the plaintiff
compensates the defendant for losses incurred because of the
enjoinder.1 33 As a result, a party to a nuisance suit is generally forced
to put all his eggs in one basket and hope the court's holding is in his
favor. Ultimately, environmental regulation through nuisance actions

127. Halper, supra note 30, at 91; see supra text accompanying notes 101-03 (describing the
difficulty of defining "nuisance" and the circularity of the definition). According to Halper,
economic development, attempts by lawyers to use nuisance law in unintended ways, and efforts
by academics to rationalize the doctrine and put it in a united framework have contributed to the
"messiness." Halper, supra note 30, at 91.
128. Heimert, supra note 33, at 415.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 445.
132. Reinhert, supra note 8, at 1701.
133. Id. at 1701-02. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed proposed allowing the
defendant's activities to continue if the defendant pays damages for the nuisance or enjoining the
defendant's activities if the plaintiff pays damages for the defendant's loss of production. Id.
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is rarely effective and often fails to promote sustainable agriculture. 134
The monetary costs of private suits are high, and such efforts fail to
provide citizens with a reasonable expectation of freedom from
135
excessive pollution.
B. Statutory Law as Agriculture's Environmental Regulator
Like common law, statutory law has a number of shortcomings
that make it an insufficient regulator of agricultural pollution and
promoter of sustainable agriculture. Existing laws attempt to regulate
water pollution, soil pollution, and noxious odors separately instead of
employing methods to control the problems collectively, which makes
regulation of multi-pollutant sources like farms difficult.136
1. Modern Regulatory Schemes are Inefficient
First, environmental regulations fall short when it comes to
maintaining regulatory standards that are technologically and
environmentally up to date with modern agricultural practices such as
using genetically engineered crops and computer-aided chemical
applications. 137 An "information bottleneck" exists in which the
regulatory process is constrained by the demands for information
placed upon the EPA and state agencies when they are setting
environmental standards.1 38 The EPA is responsible for collecting
information regarding economic conditions, pollutants, and pollution
control technology before setting standards. 39 It can be difficult, if not
impossible, to access all of the information necessary to establish
40
regulatory standards or ensure that the information is correct.
Furthermore, the EPA is not equipped to keep up with the new
emissions, effluents, and technologies that are being developed
134. Heimert, supra note 33, at 446.
135. Id.
136. Allison N. Hatchett, Bovines and Global Warming: How the Cows are Heating Things
Up and What Can Be Done to Cool Them Down, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 767, 790
(2005).
137. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursorto a New Paradigm?,89 GEO. L.J. 257, 262 (2001).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 267.
140. Id. For example, regulators need information on exposure pathways, diffusion models,
and dose-response relationships to derive a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), which is the
maximum amount of a pollutant that a water body can receive and still meet water quality
standards under the Clean Water Act. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, TMDL Definition - What is a
Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)?, http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/intro.html#definition (last
visited Sept. 29, 2008).
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continually for agricultural production. Although the agency screens
one hundred chemicals per year to determine if they should be subject
to regulatory standards, 141 this comprises only a small percentage of
the chemical substances released into the environment annually.142
Similarly, determining the "best available technology"1 43 for
pollution control is daunting. Because regulators determine the best
available technology for a wide variety of pollution sources, the
standards imposed may be more costly and less effective for some
polluters and more effective and less costly for others. 144 Furthermore,
regulators cannot anticipate future technological improvements. As a
result, standards for the best available technology may actually
become a ceiling for emissions performance rather than a floor.1 45 The
applied standards may freeze technology at its current capabilities
because private polluters have no incentive to improve the technology
and raise the standard further.146 In spite of the EPA's best efforts, its
technology requirements simply do not measure up.
2. Regulations Specific to Agricultural Production are Inconsistent or
Nonexistent
For traditional
agricultural
operations, environmental
regulation is practically nonexistent. Some commentators observe that
agriculture has been given a "license to pollute" because it lacks a
comprehensive regulatory program of its own. 147 Under the CWA,
traditional farms are rarely regulated. The CWA, which primarily
targets point sources of pollution, defines "point source" to exclude
most discharges from agricultural land, including irrigation return
flows and runoff. 148 Although CAFOs qualify as point sources of
pollution and are regulated under the CWA, agricultural runoff
remains the largest contributor of non-point source pollution. 49 In
2000, amendments to the CWA added new regulations for non-point
sources of pollution, but the EPA only regulates non-point sources that
141. Karkkainen, supra note 137, at 265.
142. Id. at 263.
143. "Best Available Control Technology ('BACT')" is defined by the EPA as "[t]he most
stringent technology available for controlling emissions." U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Terms of
Environment: Glossary, Abbreviations and Acronyms, http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/
bterms.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
144. Karkkainen, supra note 137, at 269.
145. Id.

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 267.
Connard, supra note 18, at 129.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
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emit effluent into a small number of the most distressed waterways in
the country. 150 States must report their distressed waterways to the
EPA and establish Total Maximum Daily Loads ("TMDLs") for various
pollutants subject to EPA approval. 151 Through the TMDL process, the
EPA hopes to encourage states to develop effective strategies to
improve water quality. Unfortunately, this slight regulation of non152
point sources has yet to demonstrate any substantial results.
Furthermore, environmental regulations often are inconsistent
and can deter farmers from pursuing more sustainable methods of
production. For instance, the standards regulating the production of
genetically modified organisms ("GMOs") are more stringent than
those regulating pesticide use. 153 A pesticide's potential to induce
resistance in a target organism is not subject to scientific review
unless the pesticide is contained in a genetically modified crop. 154 As a
result, farmers rely on a method to increase productivity that is more
loosely regulated, such as pesticide use, even though an alternative
method like GMO production may be more sustainable.
3. Remedies for Noncompliance are Insufficient
Although private individuals can bring claims against polluting
farms under the CWA and CAA, the CWA only offers injunctive relief
for noncompliance.1 55 This all-or-nothing approach prevents the EPA
from balancing the value of the activity against the gravity of the
harm. If a CAFO is unable to comply with EPA regulations, it could be
enjoined from operating altogether. If farmers could pay damages for
violating the regulations instead, the EPA could determine the most
efficient method for handling noncompliance.
Furthermore, when an injunction is the only available remedy
under the CWA and nuisance actions are preempted, the
constitutional validity of the statute is in question. 56 A statute that
alters the rules of liability and preempts the common law mechanism
for compensation may violate the Equal Protection Clause by
discriminating between those whose injuries deserve more

150. Id.
151. ASSESSMENT AND WATERSHED PROTECTION DIVISION, EPA 440/4-91-001, GUIDANCE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS 1-2 (1991),

available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/decisions/.
152. Connard, supra note 18, at 132-33.
153. Adelman & Barton, supra note 12, at 33-34.
154. Id.

155. Heimert, supranote 33, at 434.
156. Id. at 440.
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compensation than the statute allows and those whose injuries are
remedied through the relief available under the statute. 157 Most state
courts presume a statute does not replace the common law
mechanisms for vindicating rights unless the legislature demonstrates
a clear intent to do so. 158 Although courts are hesitant to eliminate
common law causes of action, a court may infer preemption when a
statute is silent about the law's preservation. 159 Therefore, defendants
may have a legitimate constitutional challenge against regulatory
statutes that eliminate damages as a form of relief for those who bring
claims against neighboring polluters.
4. Regulations are Ineffective Deterrents Against Future Pollution
Regulatory schemes are ineffective deterrents against pollution
because they set penalties for polluting farmers based on the costs
avoided or benefits obtained through noncompliance rather than on
the cost of the environmental harms caused by noncompliance. If
courts had perfect access to information, regulations would deter
negligent behavior equally well by "assessing damages based on harm
created or by taxing away all benefits received."' 160 When a court
makes even the slightest error in its estimation of benefit or harm, the
liability-based-upon-harm rule is superior. 16' Taxing away the
polluter's gain is suboptimal in the current imperfect system, since a
small error in estimating that gain will cause the polluter to pollute
again, even when the harm inflicted on the environment greatly
outweighs the benefit to the polluter. 62 A better deterrent would be a
regulatory scheme that, like negligence, requires a farmer to
compensate his neighbors for the environmental degradation his
noncompliance causes.
5. Implementing Environmental Regulations is Resource-Intensive
Perhaps the most blatant flaw in the current regulatory regime
is that it requires such an enormous amount of economic resources
and enforcement personnel that the government cannot possibly
implement the programs at their optimal levels. 63 This weakness,

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 449-50.
Harris, supranote 26, at 665.
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which is common to command-and-control regulations, is further
magnified in the agriculture industry. With limited resources
available to them, regulators concentrate their time and money on
point source pollution, which is easier to measure and monitor than
non-point source pollution. The EPA is left with insufficient resources
to combat non-point source pollution effectively, even though it may be
a significant contributor to environmental degradation.
C. Agriculture Requires an Alternative Method of Environmental
Regulation
Both common law deterrence mechanisms and regulatory
schemes administered by the EPA have benefits and shortcomings. In
an effort to combine the approaches to reach an optimal method of
environmental regulation, Harvard Law School professor Steve
Shavell proposes four factors to consider when choosing whether to
apply ex ante statutes and regulations or ex post nuisance actions to
cope with a pollution problem. 164 A comparison of the relative amount
of knowledge possessed by the regulators and private parties, a
polluter's capacity to pay damages, the likelihood of a nuisance suit,
and administrative costs should determine which approach is optimal,
according to Shavell. 165 For instance, if the regulator possesses more
knowledge on the issue than private parties and a nuisance suit is
unlikely, then the regulator should sanction the polluter for
noncompliance. On the other hand, if administrative costs of enforcing
environmental regulations are high and a suit is likely, the agency
should permit private individuals to regulate the pollution by filing a
nuisance claim.
Even with these factors in mind, these approaches still fail to
achieve the optimal balance between regulating the environment
effectively and promoting sustainable agriculture. Tort remedies
afford farmers few defenses and are difficult to apply in the pollution
context because the environmental harms resulting from agricultural
production are spread diffusely over a large area. And regulatory
regimes that punish polluters by taxing away their benefits from
polluting cannot regulate the constant changes in agricultural
production
effectively.1 66
Notwithstanding
Shavell's
theory,
agricultural production requires agriculturists and environmentalists

164. Heimert, supra note 33, at 446.
165. Id.
166. See supra Section III.B (describing inefficiency as a disadvantage of command-andcontrol regulations).
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to consider an alternative to the common law and statutory regulation
of farm waste.
IV. GOOD NEIGHBOR AGREEMENTS: A SOUND ALTERNATIVE
As an alternative to command-and-control regulatory schemes
and common law remedies, a number of industrial facilities across the
country have implemented voluntary self-compliance methods to curb
pollution and mend relationships with communities. A good neighbor
agreement is one method of self-compliance that has been used by
large-scale industrial polluters since the 1980s. It is a legally binding
167 and industry.16 8
agreement negotiated between the stakeholders
The violating industry "agrees to reduce or eliminate pollution risks to
the surrounding community." 169 By adapting the concept to the
agriculture industry, parties can use these agreements to promote
sustainable agriculture and resolve disputes between farmers and
neighbors.
A. Using Self-Compliance and Public Participationto Regulate
Pollution
As society seeks an alternative to common law and statutory
approaches to environmental regulation, American corporations have
adopted a variety of self-compliance programs, indicating that
businesses view environmental protection as obligatory rather than
optional. 170 In addition, communities have become more active in the
regulatory process, using both informal and formal approaches to
regulate local polluters. Examples of these approaches include
informally picketing in front of polluting companies that fail to adopt
stringent environmental standards and formally requiring municipal
governments to assess environmental impact statements before
granting operating permits to polluters.
Self-compliance programs, which take a variety of forms, have
the potential to benefit both the businesses that adopt them and the
environment they aim to protect. 171 One common method of selfcompliance is the environmental audit, which evaluates a firm's
167. Stakeholders generally consist of private citizens, community organizations,
environmental organizations, and labor unions. Marianne Adriatico, Note, 5 HASTINGS W.-N.W.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 285, 288 (1999).

168.
169.
170.
171.

I use the term "industry" to refer to the entity that is causing the pollution.
Adriatico, supra note 167, at 288.
Harris, supranote 26, at 665-66.
Id. at 666.
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compliance with federal and state regulations and is included in the
company's overall environmental management program. 172 To conduct
an audit, a firm either hires an independent auditing team or, through
the use of its own employees, collects information regarding pollution
reduction technology and emissions. 173 When an auditor finds the firm
compliant, the firm is heralded as environmentally friendly and
benefits from the positive publicity. When an audit reveals
noncompliance, however, legal liability becomes a serious risk. 174
Audits are generally less candid than they should be because
management wants to protect the firm from such risks. 175 As a result,
some states are calling for a self-evaluation privilege that would
protect documents and communications collected in the audit and
limit the liability to which a firm could be subject for
noncompliance. 176 Other states believe the audit information should be
discoverable, however, and the uncertainty of liability alone may deter
firms from auditing themselves.
In the alternative, a number of communities have become more
involved in the environmental regulation of local polluters.
Communities sometimes use informal regulations to force polluting
firms to comply with community-generated standards. 177 While an
informal approach provides communities with a measure of flexibility
as to the standards they employ, the penalties that communities may
impose on a violator (such as picketing and boycotts) can be costly and
disruptive. 178 Furthermore, communities that use only informal
methods are at a disadvantage because they do not have sufficient
access to information about a polluter's emissions, production
processes, or environmental policies. 79

172. Paula C. Murray & Eric W. Orts, Environmental Disclosure and Evidentiary Privilege,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1997).

173. Lisa Koven, Note, The Environmental Self-Audit Evidentiary Privilege, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1167, 1170 (1998).
174. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 647
(2000) (explaining that although technically voluntary, standards may become de facto
mandatory).
175. Peter A. Gish, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and EnvironmentalAudit Reports, 25
ENVTL. L. 73, 82 (1995).
176. Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy,
16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 419-20 (1992).
177. Karkkainen, supra note 137, at 316.
178. Id.; see also David W. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior Through Environmental
Management Systems, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 104 (2006) (citing Karkkainen
that "the informal monitoring regime triggered by public information disclosure imposes diverse
forms of social and market-based pressure on corporate environmental behavior").
179. Karkkainen, supra note 137, at 316.
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The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, a
federal initiative that provides local citizens with information about
nearby hazardous chemicals and establishes a planning and response
program for emergency situations, has assisted some communities by
guaranteeing them access to information available in an online
database called a toxic release inventory ("TRI").1 80 Unfortunately, the
information in the database is organized poorly and is difficult to sift
through. Furthermore, the database is only useful if citizens have
Internet access, which may inhibit a substantial number of interested
parties from using the information.18 1 Thus far, only firms that have a
high level of emissions and are of a certain size develop TRIs
regularly;1 8 2 TRIs are not required for small firms like the average
farm.
Communities also have developed more formal methods for
local environmental regulation. A community group may conduct an
assessment and formulate an impact statement of how it believes the
community will be affected if a particular firm either moves into the
community or expands its existing operation.1 8 3 City commissions in
some municipalities must take into account the firm's impact
statement and hold public hearings before granting the firm a permit
to expand or build in the area.18 4 Likewise, citizens may form
community working-groups, comprised solely of local residents, to
evaluate upcoming proposals or facilities located within the
community.1 8 5 The groups provide notice to the community of
upcoming meetings and discussions and present their opinions on the
issues raised.186
In addition to targeting polluters directly, the public can
participate in the EPA's development of environmental regulations
that impact local communities. Although regulatory development
generally includes a notice-and-comment period for communities to
vocalize their concerns, a presumption in favor of the agency's report
makes it difficult to amend the agency's planned course of action
180. 42 U.S.C. § 110236); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The CarbonNeutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1729-30 (2007).
181. Kathryn E. Durham-Hammer, Left to Wonder: Reevaluating, Reforming, and
Implementing the Emergency Planningand Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 29 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 323, 328-29 (2004).
182. Id. at 333.
183. Sara Pirk, Expanding Public Participation in Environmental Justice: Methods,
Legislation, Litigation and Beyond, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 207, 234 (2002).
184. Diane Schwartz, Environmental Racism: Using Legal and Social Means to Achieve
Environmental Justice, 12 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 409, 431 (1997).

185. Pirk, supra note 183, at 235.
186. Id. at 236.
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through comments alone.1 8 7 Furthermore, local community members
and farmers do not track every regulation the EPA develops and
probably would not submit comments in response to such regulations.
As a result of the shortcomings of this requirement, other methods
have been used to encourage public participation.
For instance, the EPA may arrange a regulatory negotiation
that involves the regulators, regulated parties, and interested parties
in rulemaking by encouraging cooperation and problem solving. 88
Although the negotiations allow community groups to be directly
involved in the process, the groups that generally participate are wellorganized special interest groups rather than local citizens and
neighbors who have a variety of concerns with emissions.1 8 9
Furthermore, the negotiations can be very costly since the
participants must hire technical experts who can verify their
arguments. 90 While regulatory negotiation is a step in the right
direction, it may be prohibitively time consuming and expensive for
concerned community members and farmers.
Citizen advisory groups are even more representative of the
public participation methods than negotiations. 191 Under this method,
the sponsoring agency chooses citizens directly affected by the
regulations to serve on an advisory board. 192 The advisory board
investigates the issue and recommends solutions. 93 Because the
board's decisions are not binding,1 94 however, the members of the
board may have little power to effect change.
Concern with environmental injustice has also improved public
participation in environmental rulemaking. Environmental injustice
occurs when poor communities disproportionately bear the burdens of
environmental hazards. 195 The problem results in part because private
citizens do not believe that they have real power to affect
environmental decisionmaking. In fact, most major agency decisions
187. Id.
188. Alex Tynberg, The Natural Step and Its Implication for a Sustainable Future, 7
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73, 98-99 (2000).
189. Pirk, supra note 183, at 236.
190. Tynberg, supranote 188, at 99.
191. See John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards
in Environmental Decision-Making, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 921-22 (1998) (describing the advantages
and disadvantages of citizen advisory groups).
192. Id. at 921.
193. Id.
194. Pirk, supra note 183, at 216.
195. Id. at 208; see also Uma Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice: Integration,
Implementation, and Judicial Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 601, 608 (2006) (explaining
the importance of public participation to the environmental justice movement).
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are made prior to any public hearings or other solicited public
participation, and historically, community groups have made little
difference in environmental policies. 196 As a result, communities are
not inclined to participate in environmental decisionmaking. 197 In
1994, President Clinton signed an executive order requiring each
1 98
federal agency to make environmental justice part of its mission.
Even so, without equal access to information, communities cannot
negotiate on a level playing field with the agencies, industry leaders,
and experts.
B. Good Neighbor Agreements: Merging Public Participationand SelfCompliance
Good neighbor agreements ("GNAs") incorporate aspects of
public participation and self-compliance into a cohesive method of
pollution regulation. These agreements are based on the theory that
"citizens and workers should view corporations as neighbors and apply
similar standards of behavior to them."'199 Therefore, corporations
should not "endanger the lives of the people with whom they share
land, water and air."20 0 Rather, by developing GNAs, private citizens
can hold firms accountable for their contribution to environmental
degradation.
Since the phrase was first coined in the 1980s, 20 1 GNAs have
20 2
evolved into sophisticated tools for environmental regulation.
Originally, GNAs granted community groups an informal right to
inspect local industries. 20 3 In the early 1990s, an environmental
watchdog group developed the "Minnesota model" for GNAs, which
reduced nonbinding emissions goals to writing. 20 4 Today, most GNAs
196. Pirk, supra note 183, at 208.
197. Id.
198. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). The order also addressed the
disproportionate effects of environmental pollution to human health and created working groups
in each agency to cope with the issue. Pirk, supra note 183, at 221.
199. Gary D. Bass, Enhancing the Public's Right-to-Know About Environmental Issues, 4
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 287, 289 (1993).
200. Id. at 298.
201. Sanford Lewis & Diane Henkels, Good Neighbor Agreements: A Tool for Environmental
and Social Justice, 23 SOC. JUST. J. 4 (1996), reprinted on CPN Home Page, http://www.cpn.org/
topics/environment/goodneighbor.html.
202. See Douglas S. McKinney et al., Evaluating the Use of Good Neighbor Agreements for
Environmental and Community Protection (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Col. Sch. of
Law),,Aug. 2004, at iii, available at http://www.northernplains.org/ourwork/goodneighbor/files/
GoodNeighborAgreementsEvaluationReport.pdf (describing the evolution of GNAs).
203. Lewis & Henkels, supra note 201, at 4.
204. Id.
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in the United States are legally enforceable. 20 5 The terms are always
in writing and list the requisite standards that the private firms must
meet.
Both local citizens and participating firms benefit from GNAs.
The agreements allow citizens to participate in firms' environmental
decisionmaking. 20 6
and
planning,
assessments,
inspections,
Community stakeholders work directly with the industry to create
solutions for the environmental problems at hand. 20 7 Firms are enticed
to enter GNAs in order to establish positive relationships with local
government and employees. 208 A firm's public image affects its ability
to obtain loyal workers, the rate at which it is taxed locally (as
determined by city officials), and the regulations the community
chooses to impose on its operations. 20 9 GNAs often include provisions
by which a firm agrees to provide information to the local community
beyond that required by law, reduce emissions below legal
requirements, or provide local subsidies to support public health
clinics or parks. 2 10 Because both industries and private citizens seek to
benefit from the agreements, parties successfully negotiate GNAs
when the relationship between the stakeholders is balanced.
Several major principles work to establish the balanced
2 11
relationship between a local industry and community stakeholders.
These include: (1) ensuring a right of access to information for all
parties involved; (2) encouraging stakeholder initiative to work with
the polluting firm to develop a GNA; (3) sharing control among all the
stakeholders in the participation process; (4) securing parity in
decisionmaking; (5) hiring independent experts; and (6) creating an
benefits and
enforceable, holistic agreement that provides shared
212
practices.
management
best
for
standards
includes

205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Harris, supranote 26, at 666.
Pirk, supra note 183, at 238.
Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1458 (2006).

209. Id.
210. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2064 (2005). Vandenbergh identifies GNAs as a type of private second-order agreement, or one
entered into by private parties in response to the existence or absence of first-order government
regulations. Id. at 2029.
211. Adriatico, supra note 167, at 289.
212. Id. at 289-90. These principals were developed by Sanford Lewis, the former Director of
the Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable Industries and a major proponent of GNAs.
StrategicCounsel.net, About Us, http://home.earthlink.net/-gnproject
AboutUs.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
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Equal access to information is, essentially, the key to GNA
success. 213 Primarily, stakeholder audits ensure this equal access. 2 14
Audits provide opportunities for local stakeholders to inspect facilities
themselves or oversee an auditing group that performs the
inspection. 215 The firm gives stakeholders a right of access to industry
documentation on key activities that affect the environment. 216 Equal
access generates consensus, and as a result, each stakeholder benefits
from the shared information. 217
In addition to acquiring information, stakeholders must be
active in their negotiations. A GNA is not signed until every
participant agrees to the terms of the contract; unless parties seek
compromise, stalemates can result, destroying a GNA's chance of
success. Because of this, it may be helpful to hire independent experts
to "bolster the bargaining positions of stakeholders on technical
matters. 218 Parties to the agreement should work collaboratively so
the terms of the final approved GNA will benefit everyone involved.
Although the total number of these agreements is unclear,
there are at least several dozen in the United States today with
substantial potential for more. 2 19 Most often, GNAs are linked to a
permit process or serve as settlement agreements in the aftermath of
an industrial accident. 22 0 For instance, the Chevron Refinery in
Richmond, California, agreed to a GNA with the West County Toxics
Coalition, Communities for a Better Environment, and People Do! in

response to CAA violations in

1992.221

When the refinery sought a

state air quality permit for additional manufacturing, the permit was
challenged, which led to the GNA negotiations. 222 In exchange for the
permit, Chevron agreed to install leakless valves, refuse pollution
credits for emissions reductions, and contribute five million dollars
over five years to local communities.2 2 3 Likewise, the City of
Philadelphia and the Sun Oil Company negotiated the Sun Oil
Agreement, a GNA enacted in 1997 to settle a lawsuit that a

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Adriatico, supra note 167, at 291-95.
Id. at 289.
Pirk, supra note 183, at 238.
Id.
Id. at 238-39.
Adriatico, supra note 167, at 289.
Vandenbergh, supranote 210, at 2064.
Adriatico, supra note 167, at 289.
Id. at 290-91; McKinney et al., supra note 202, at 6.
McKinney et al., supra note 202, at 6.
Adriatico, supra, note 167, at 290-91.
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community group brought against the firm. 224 The agreement required
Sun Oil to invest five million dollars to improve its refinery and reduce
emissions. In addition, the firm was obligated to plant trees, construct
a bike trail, and fund environmental education programs in the
community. 225 Both the Sun Oil and Chevron agreements resulted
from the companies' efforts to avoid further litigation and compensate
the community for past pollution.
A firm may also be inspired to sign a GNA if it faces the threat
of litigation. In 2000, the Stillwater Mining Company in Billings,
Montana, agreed to a GNA that addressed environmental concerns
after the mine sought permits for expansion and was threatened with
potential lawsuits from the community. 226 The mine agreed to
establish a mechanism for communication with the community, allow
the Northern Plains Resource Council (a citizens' group) to participate
in company decisions, and minimize adverse environmental impacts
227
on the community in exchange for minimal future litigation.
Because the firm realized the possible consequences of litigation, it
was motivated to negotiate with the Resource Council. The threat of
litigation, as well as other concerns, motivates firms to negotiate
GNAs and has led to an increase in the number of these agreements in
recent years.
C. Using GNAs to Regulate the Environmental Impacts of Production
Agriculture
Although few GNAs currently target production agriculture as
a source of degradation, the agreements are becoming a more likely
alternative for environmental regulation of CAFOs and other
agricultural operations. Idaho Dairies, a dairy operator and CAFO,
signed a GNA in 1998 with the Citizens of Owyhee County Organized
Association, a private citizens' group. 228 When William K. Chisholm, a
local resident, challenged the dairy's application for a water permit,
the Idaho Department of Water Resources denied the application. 229

224. Id. at 290; see also McKinney et al., supra note 202, at 7 (describing the Sun Oil
Agreement).
225. Adriatico, supranote 167, at 290.
226. Ric Richardson, Governing Western Mineral Resources: The Emerging of Collaboration,
43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 561, 577 (2003); McKinney et al., supra note 202, at 8--9 n.6.
227. Richardson, supranote 226, at 577-78.
228. McKinney et al., supra note 202, at 8.
229. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., Application for Transfer No. 5464, Salmon Falls Land &
Livestock Co., Amended Preliminary Order, at 9, available at http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/about/
orders/Salmon%20Falls%20APO.pdf; McKinney et al., supra note 202, at 8.
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As a result, the dairy agreed to a GNA with terms regulating the
disposal of manure on its property. 230 The formation of this agreement,
one of the first GNAs regulating farm practices, indicates how farmers
and communities can use contract law to curb the level of farm
pollution nationwide, if they are willing to negotiate with community
groups by forming GNAs.
1. Incentives for Entering Good Neighbor Agreements
When it comes to reducing environmental degradation caused
by agricultural production, contracting offers several key advantages
over traditional regulatory methods. First and foremost, contract law
allows the parties to consider both economically quantifiable and nonquantifiable costs and benefits in the agreement. An agricultural
operation may provide a number of benefits to society, like ensuring
food security, 23 ' maintaining open spaces, and preserving an image of
idealized agrarian life that plays an important psychological function
in American communities. 232 These social benefits are not often, if
ever, quantifiable, and are therefore undervalued by nuisance law and
command-and-control regulations. 233 In developing the terms of a
GNA, a farmer provides information regarding the social and
economic costs and benefits of his farm, which gives the community
234
group access to more information than it would have otherwise.
Because contract law permits the parties to bring to the table any
number of factors for consideration, the contracting parties can ensure
that agricultural operations are adequately valued in the final
agreement.
In addition to ensuring greater accuracy in valuing farm
practices, contracting also protects the public image of farmers and
farm operations by encouraging open dialogue between communities
and farmers. Farmers who voluntarily provide community groups with
information about their operations and vow to maintain
environmentally
sound practices are viewed as competent

230. McKinney et al., supra note 202, at 8.
231. Christopher D. Stone, Land Use and Biodiversity, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967, 982 n.52
(2001).
232. Alexander A. Reinert, supra note 8, at 1731-32.
233. See supra Section III.A. 1 (explaining how nuisance law undervalues the social benefits
of agriculture).
234. Janet Seigel, Note, Negotiatingfor Environmental Justice: Turning Polluters into "Good
Neighbors" Through Collaborative Bargaining,10 N.Y.U. ENV. L. J. 147, 180 (2002).
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environmental stewards. 235 The public also views the farming industry
more favorably when producers run their operations with a measure of
transparency. 236 Such transparency ensures that a producer remains
accountable for fulfilling the terms of the agreement because the
community may hold him liable if he breaches the GNA. 237 The
parties' relationship is a symbiotic one in which the farmer relies on
the community group to hold him accountable, and the community
group relies on the farmer to provide access to key information. 238 The
opportunity to protect their farms' images and social value through
contract law incentivizes agriculturists to enter GNAs.
2. Constructing Agreements to Regulate Agricultural Pollution
As with other industries, the agricultural industry mandates
certain prerequisites that must be met for a GNA to regulate
agricultural emissions effectively. First, the polluter must be
motivated to negotiate an agreement. Generally, this motivation
arises as a result of a "triggering event." 239 If the polluter is a CAFO,
the triggering events are identical to those in other industries:
applications for permits 240 or settlements from suits filed for violating
federal or state environmental regulations. On the other hand, where
the source of the contamination is, for instance, runoff from a large
number of small farms, permits are not required and federal
regulatory law generally does not apply. The triggering event in this
case may instead be a neighboring landowner's filing or threat to file a
nuisance suit against the producer. 24 1 In this way, nuisance law
supports an effective and efficient contractual method of regulation.
Of course, like corporate firms, farmers also may be motivated by a
desire to cultivate positive relationships with the community. 242 Even
235. Larry E. Ribstein, supra note 208, at 1457-58; see Michael P. Vandenbergh, supra note
210, at 2065-66 (recognizing that corporations often participate in GNAs to improve their public
image).
236. See Robert A. Coulthard, The Changing Landscape of America's Farmland: A
Comparative Look at Policies Which Help Determine the Portrait of Our Land-Are There
Lessons We Can Use From the EU?, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 261, 285 (2001) (describing agritourism
as one method farmers use to increase transparency of farm operations).
237. Janet Seigel, supra note 234, at 180.
238. Adriatico, supra note 167, at 293.
239. See supra Section IV.B (listing the triggering events that motivate corporations to enter
GNAs).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 220-23 (describing applications for permits as a
triggering event of firms).
241. See supra Section II.A (describing common law regulations including nuisance suits).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10 (describing a desire to cultivate positive
relations as one reason that corporations enter GNAs).
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so, it is unlikely that farmers will recognize the gravity of the
environmental situation and the level of community concern unless
citizens have the opportunity to voice those concerns first.
Members of the local community also must be organized and
able to present a coherent message in order for negotiations to
succeed. Citizens' groups should meet with the agricultural polluter to
delineate the issues to resolve 24 3 and identify additional stakeholders
to involve in the process. 244 Agriculture is part of the culture of many
small communities, 245 so in the early stages of the negotiations,
stakeholders likely will present a wide array of opinions and possible
solutions to the pollution problems caused by agriculture. 246 Such
divergence of opinion may result in the formation of multiple citizens'
groups reflecting varying levels of concern with the environmental
threats caused by agricultural emissions.
A GNA should be very detailed, prescribing the exact standards
applied and remedies available under the agreement if either party
breaches. To constitute a valid contract, both parties must bargain for
favorable terms in the agreement. 247 The parties may opt to include
pollution prevention efforts that are methods-based, standards-based,
or a combination of the two. 248 Methods-based terms focus on the
agricultural practices that farmers should implement to protect air,
water, and soil. Such methods include carbon sequestering, buffering,
constructing efficient irrigation systems, composting, and disposing of
animal waste carefully. In contrast, standards-based terms include
maximum emissions or discharge levels for point source pollution and
the TMDLs (below the national standards) of pollutants permitted in
any stream running through or near the agricultural operation. For
point source discharge, the agreement may allocate a portion of the

243. Lewis & Henkels, supra note 201, at 4.
244. Id.

245. A bold example of this local support is "community supported agriculture," which occurs
when a community pledges its support for a farm operation so that the farmland becomes,
"either legally or spiritually, the community's farm .. " U.S. Dept. of Agric., Nat'l Agric.
Library, Alternative Farming Systems Info. Ctr., Community Supported Agriculture,
http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/csa/csa.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 245-48 (suggesting that a number of groups may be
involved in the negotiations and citizens may have diverse opinions of the agreement).
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981). For instance, consideration may be
an agreement not to file a nuisance claim in exchange for paying for environmental cleanup or
implementing sustainable agricultural practices.
248. Although the EPA uses a variety of technical terms in the CWA and CAA to describe
similar concepts, I use the terms "methods-based" and "standards-based" because, from an
agricultural perspective, they vividly describe the differences between the two approaches and
the consequences they impose on farmers.
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proposed maximum daily load to each source; such allocations will not,
249
however, reduce non-point source discharge.
In addition, the citizens' group also must negotiate for access to
information on environmental quality. The final agreement may
require the farmer to perform regular soil and water testing or submit
annual reports to the citizens' group that describe environmental
practices on the property. 250 Because most farms are not open to the
public, 25 1 the parties should agree upon an independent auditor who
can visit the property regularly to observe the producer's
environmental practices. An independent auditor who has a thorough
understanding of the agriculture industry could provide objective
assessments of agricultural practices. Use of an independent auditor
also would protect the farmer from any negative reactions that a
community member might have to established agricultural
practices. 252 Regardless of the method adopted, the citizens' group
should consider the type and amount of information needed and
include a provision in the agreement granting itself access to that
information.
Farmers also must bargain for consideration in the
agreements. In a GNA, the farmer's consideration probably would
include a binding arbitration clause preventing the contracting
stakeholders from filing nuisance suits against the farmer in the
future. The agreement may also grant the producer a much-needed
easement, buffer, or other property right conveyable between private
landowners. 253 In addition, CAFOs may commit to the agreement to
receive permits for production or expansion of existing operations

249. TMDLs typically include the maximum amount of a pollutant that a water body can
receive and still meet water quality standards as well as an allocation of that amount to the
pollutant's point sources. EPA, supra note 140. However, that allocation cannot be made for nonpoint sources. Id.
250. The USDA website, as well as a county extension office, provides information pertaining
to soil and water testing and specific tests that an agreement could mandate. U.S. Dept. of
Agric., Nat'l Agric. Library, Alternative Farming Systems Info. Ctr., Soil and Water
http://afsic.nal.usda.gov/nal-display/index.php?info-center=2&taxlevel=l&tax
Management,
_subject=293 (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
251. Of course, some farms are exceptions. See U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., 2002
Farm Bill: Provisions and Economic Implications, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/AP/
AP022/AP022.pdf (describing "agrotourism" as an initiative area for competitive grants under
the 2002 Farm Bill) (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
252. It is the possibility of negative audits that prevent some corporations from conducting
voluntary audits. See the text accompanying notes 174-75 for a more thorough explanation.
253. A GNA could be an excellent opportunity to negotiate property rights with neighbors.
These private agreements could avoid government involvement that results in zoning, buffering,
or redistricting. See Paster, supra note 11, at 293-301 (describing these government programs).
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under the CWA or to escape further penalties for failure to comply
254
with environmental regulations.
If any party fails to meet the terms of the agreement, the nonbreaching party has a valid breach of contract claim. 255 Although a
GNA does not have to be written in order to be binding, a nonbreaching party will find it considerably easier to provide evidence of
the breach if the terms of the agreement are in writing and signed by
the breaching party. The breaching party may allege all of the
defenses common to contract law. 256 For instance, if the nonoccurrence
of a particular event was a basic assumption upon which the
agreement was made and the event occurred, the breaching party may
be able to claim impossibility or impracticability as a defense. 25 7 This
defense can only apply, however, if none of the contracting parties are
at fault or assumed the risk that the event might occur. 258 If, for
example, a farmer were alleged to have breached the GNA by failing
to bring a stream's TMDLs into compliance with the standards set
forth in the agreement, a court might find that compliance was
impracticable if a company later built a factory next to the farm and
discharged effluent into the stream, greatly affecting the stream's
TMDLs and preventing the farmer from complying with the
agreement.
Similarly, a contracting party may also raise the defenses of
mistake or misrepresentation if appropriate. A mutual mistake occurs
when both parties make a mistake regarding a basic, material
assumption of the contract at the time the contract was formed. 259 As
260
a result, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party.
Misrepresentation, on the other hand, occurs when a party makes a
fraudulent and material statement not in accord with the facts; if the
hearer is justified in relying on such facts, he or she can recover
damages. 26 1 Where environmental standards are concerned, instances
254. See supra text Section IV'.B (describing identical terms for agreements with corporate
firms).

255. However, if the agreement contains a binding arbitration clause, the parties will likely
arbitrate according to the terms of the agreement. See infra Section IV.C.3 (discussing binding
arbitration as a way to avoid the cost and time involved in a lawsuit).
256. Defenses include: mistake, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151-53 (1981);
misrepresentation, § 159; unconscionability, § 208; impracticability or impossibility, § 261; and
the statute of frauds, § 110(1)(e).
257. § 261; see also Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 460 (Cal. 1916)
(succeeding in an impracticability defense).
258. § 261.
259. § 152.
260. Id.
261. § 159.
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of mistake or misrepresentation could be consequences of GNAs. If, for
instance, a farmer agrees to lower the level of E. coli in a local stream
by fifty percent, only to discover later that, at the time the contract
was formed, the E. coli bacteria count was zero, the provision would be
voidable for mutual mistake.
When the breaching party is unable to present a valid defense,
the court will award the non-breaching party damages. Generally, the
remedy for a breach of contract is expectation damages, a form of
compensatory relief that makes the non-breaching party ex post whole
by putting him in the position he would have been in if the contract
had been fulfilled. 262 Expectation damages consist of: direct damages,
which compensate for the loss of value of the subject matter of the
contract; incidental damages, which are the costs of obtaining
substitute performance; and consequential damages, or losses that
flow from the breach. 263 Because it may be impossible for a court to
value, for instance, the cost to a citizens' group 264 of polluted water or
poor air quality, the court may be persuaded to award restitution 265 or
reliance damages 266 instead. Like the damages that may be awarded
in a nuisance suit, the type and amount of relief for breach of contract
is difficult to predict. So, parties should negotiate the provisions of a
GNA carefully, considering every likely outcome of the contract and
protecting themselves from liability.
3. Challenges of Implementation
Although GNAs have the capacity to serve a much-needed
regulatory function, there are two pragmatic concerns with the
systemic use of these voluntary agreements. First, a primary maxim of
contract theory is that a contract binds only the parties to the
agreement. 267 A party cannot enforce a contract against one who
refuses to assent to the terms of the agreement. 268 Therefore, even if a
GNA between a farmer and local citizens' group protects the farmer
262. § 347.
263. Id.
264. See generally Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114 (1929) (demonstrating the difficulty of
calculating expectation damages when the value of the promised good is unascertainable because
it supposes a state of the world that does not actually exist).
265. Restitution makes the defendant ex ante whole by putting him in the position he would
have been in if the contract never existed. § 373.
266. Reliance damages put the non-breaching party in the position he would have been in if
he had never entered the contract. § 349.
267. See § 3 ("An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more
persons.").
268. Id.
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from future nuisance actions from the members of that group, a
neighbor who is not a party to the contract may still file a nuisance
claim against the farmer. To provide the greatest incentive for a
farmer to negotiate a GNA, community members would do well to
convince any and all neighbors with a legitimate claim against the
farmer to surrender their rights under common law by signing the
agreement. Conversely, a farmer must recognize that such agreements
will not categorically protect him from tort liability. The "stubborn"
neighbor (who refuses to be a party to the agreement) or "new"
neighbor (who moves into the area after the agreement is formed) may
file a nuisance claim if he suffers harm.
In addition to the parties to the agreement, the remedies
available are also a source of concern. To remedy a breach of contract,
and absent binding arbitration or negotiation, the non-breaching party
must engage in the very act that GNAs are designed to avoid:
litigation. Just as nuisance suits require time and money, 269 contract
disputes also necessitate considerable expenditures. From the farmer's
perspective, it would seem circular to consider GNAs an escape from
nuisance claims if enforcing such agreements only resulted in similar
contract claims. In most situations, parties could avoid litigation
270
entirely by including a binding arbitration clause in the agreement.
Such a clause would reassure farmers who are concerned that signing
a GNA that might result in litigation and costly court proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION

Although the agriculture industry has advanced radically in
the last one hundred years, environmental laws that affect the
industry have not. The nuisance suit, an antiquated common law
action, fails to provide adequate controls to protect the environment or
promote sustainable agriculture. The prospect of litigation discourages
farmers, who can raise few defenses and, because of the circular
definition of "reasonable use," are unsure how to avoid liability.
Conversely, potential plaintiffs have no incentive to file nuisance
claims because by doing so they will bear heavy transaction costs and
encourage free riders to take advantage of their proactive efforts.
Furthermore, plaintiffs face the uncertainty of whether their claims

269. See supra text accompanying note 108 (describing transaction costs associated with
nuisance suits).
270. Further study is necessary to determine the effects of binding arbitration clauses on
GNAs and the consequences for farmers who are party to these agreements.
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will succeed: right-to-farm laws may prevent plaintiffs from recovering
entirely, and establishing causation can be difficult.
Nor is statutory law equipped to cope with the challenge of
regulating the agriculture industry. Farmers are often exempt from
EPA regulations, and few regulations even exist for non-point sources
of pollution like agricultural waste. Even those regulations that apply
directly to CAFOs or other agricultural operations do not provide
special protection for the most severely polluted regions of the country.
The EPA also struggles to implement and enforce these regulations,
particularly against farmers, because the agency focuses its limited
resources on point sources of pollution. Even when regulations are
enforced against the agriculture industry, the penalties for
noncompliance generally are insufficient to deter polluters from future
violations because both the regulations and remedies that reflect an
underfunded EPA cannot keep up with the growing number of
pollutants and polluters the agriculture industry produces.
In recent years GNAs have grown in popularity as potentially
effective methods of environmental regulation that incorporate
elements of both self-compliance and public participation. Through
GNAs, agriculturists can ensure proper valuation of their farms and
an accounting of the social benefits of agriculture when the
agreements are formed. This advantage alone makes GNAs a superior
alternative to nuisance law and command-and-control regulations.
While Idaho Dairies, described in Part IV, represents one of the first
cases in which a GNA was used to curb the environmental
degradation caused by farming, it should not be the last. Agricultural
pollution can be monitored and controlled effectively through wellconstructed agreements that protect the environment and promote
sustainable agriculture to a degree that the court in Cook v. Hatcher
271
could not have imagined over seventy-five years ago.
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271. Cook v. Hatcher, 9 P.2d 231, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932). Over time, further research will
be necessary to determine if these agreements have successfully rendered the "odors and sounds"
of farming less "offensive to the senses" than the court found them to be in Cook. Id.
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